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After decades on the brink of nuclear war, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
subsequent end of the Cold War in 1991 ushered in a new era of global peace and 
economic liberalization. Yet mutual efforts by the United States and Russia to 
substantially reduce their nuclear weapons arsenals have fallen short of their 
objectives. This brings up the question: what are the main barriers hindering further 
progress for the mutual reduction of nuclear weapons for the United States and Russia?  
Although both countries are currently obligated to reduce their deployed 
nuclear warheads stockpile numbers to 1,550 by 2018 under New START, there has 
been no further nuclear arms reduction cooperation between the two countries.  This 
thesis will examine the military-technical factors and geopolitical factors hindering the 
prospects for deeper nuclear arms control cooperation. Regarding military-technical 
factors, disagreements on missile defense between Moscow and Washington, in 
	
	 ii	
particular NATO’s missile defense system in Europe, have continued to stall closer 
nuclear arms control cooperation. On the other hand, geopolitical factors have reignited 
the U.S.-Russian strategic rivalry. Russia’s annexation of Crimea during the 2014 
Ukrainian crisis created a permanent rift between the Obama and Putin 
administrations. This rift was further exacerbated by a clashing policy agenda in the 
Syrian civil war and as a result, U.S.-Russian relations have deteriorated at an alarming 
rate. Given that both Ukraine and Syria are still ongoing conflicts, this thesis will 
attempt to offer a preliminary analysis of the evolving nature of nuclear arms control 
cooperation between the United States and Russia in a post-Cold War era up until the 
end of the Obama administration in 2016. 
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전략적 숙적 관계의 재설정: 





국제학과 국제협력 전공  
 
핵전쟁 발발 직전의 상황이 수십 년간 지속된 뒤, 소련 연방이 붕괴하였다. 연방
의 해체에 따라 1991년 냉전도 종식되었다. 세계 평화와 경제 자유화로 대변될 
수 있는 새 시대가 열렸고, 시대의 변화로 미국과 러시아는 상당한 양의 핵무기
를 감축하고자 노력했으나 목표를 달성하지 못했다. 미국·러시아 간 상호 핵무
기 감축의 진전을 저해한 요인은 무엇이었을까?  
신전략무기감축협정(New START)에 따라 양국은 2018년까지 배치된 
핵탄두를 1,550기로 줄여야 할 의무를 지녔음에도, 핵군축 협력과 같은 후속 조
치를 취하지 않았다. 이에 본 논문은 심도 있는 핵군축 협력의 미래를 가로막는 
군사·기술적 요인과 지정학적 요인을 검토하고자 한다. 군사·기술적 요인에서는 
미사일 방어에 대한 모스크바와 워싱턴의 의견 불일치, 특히 유럽에 배치된 북
대서양조양기구(NATO)의 미사일 방어 시스템으로 인해 핵군축의 긴밀한 협력
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이 지체된 점을 밝힌다.  
지정학적 요인에서는 지리적 입지가 미국과 러시아의 전략적 숙적관계
를 심화시킨 점을 조명한다. 2014년 우크라이나 사태 당시 러시아의 크림반도 
합병은 양국의 영구적 균열을 초래했다. 양국의 균열은 시리아 내전을 두고 각
국의 정책이 부딪히면서 틈이 더 벌어졌다. 그 결과 미러 관계는 급속도로 악화
되었다. 본 논문은 우크라이나 사태와 시리아 내전이 현재 진행 중인 분쟁이라
는 점을 고려하여, 냉전 이후부터 2016년 오바마 행정부 시기까지, 미국과 러시





주요어: 미국, 러시아, 핵군축 난제, 미사일 방어망, 2014 년 우크라이나 사태, 
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“To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in 
our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same.”1 President Obama’s 
visionary 2009 Prague speech on nuclear peace inspired hope that finally, nearly 20 
years after the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-Russian nuclear rivalry could genuinely 
move in the direction of significant arms reductions and friendlier relations. Looking 
back at the past century, the security dynamics of the world have undergone a series of 
drastic evolutions since the end of World War II. The end of World War II marked the 
beginning of a new rivalry between two of the world’s greatest superpowers: the 
United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War, lasting from 1947 until 1991, 
triggered a destructive arms race and competition for global influence between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. The ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union led to 
the spread of liberal economic policies and the abandonment of communism, opening 
the chapter for a new global order. Given that we live in a post-Cold War era in which 
the official arms race between the United States and Russia has lost its driving purpose 
and tensions have thawed to some degree, why has the subsequently planned reduction 
in nuclear weapons encountered so many barriers? 
                                                





Despite Obama’s optimistic and stirring Prague speech, internalized in the 
hearts and minds of many who have hoped for the eventual realization of a world free 
of nuclear weapons, the reality remains that the legacy of the Cold War lives on today 
in many forms, notably in the physical form of the remaining nuclear arsenals of the 
United States and Russia. The hard-learned lessons of nuclear deterrence and the 
dangers of nuclear brinkmanship in a post-Cold War world are no longer limited to the 
U.S.-Russian rivalry, as new states have joined the nuclear club. The threat of nuclear 
warfare today is most imminent in the Korean peninsula as North Korea continues its 
quest to develop functional nuclear weapons. 
         Therefore, the strategic value of nuclear weapons is far from obsolete today. 
Despite the fact that no atomic bomb has been detonated since Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki during the waning months of World War II, nuclear weapons are a greater 
threat than ever:  
Nuclear weapons, once the bone of contention between Cold War 
superpowers, within that context evolved into props and supports 
for stability- that is, for helping to freeze a political glacis that 
maintained a pacified Europe from the end of World War II until 
the end of the Cold War and beyond. In the twenty-first century, 
and especially outside of Europe, the role of nuclear weapons 
might prove to be less benign. The spread of nuclear weapons to 
revisionist states or regional rogues would certainly be accelerated 
if Iran became a nuclear weapons state, or if the proto-nuclear 
weapons capabilities of North Korea were not reversed in good 
time.2  
 
                                                
2 Cimbala, Stephen J. The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy. 
Ashgate, 2015, 10. 
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  Unraveling the strategic value of nuclear weapons in a post-Cold War era is 
not complete without the inclusion of the other more recent nuclear states, such as 
India and Pakistan. However, this thesis will focus exclusively on the two-main 
original nuclear powers, given their history and crucial role in shaping the concept of 
nuclear deterrence. The United States and Russia continue to remain number one and 
two, respectively, in terms of the size of their nuclear arsenals and their special status 
as nuclear superpowers allows them to lead the international nuclear order. 
Understanding the unique dynamics of the U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control 
relationship requires a two-fold examination of both military-technical factors and 
geopolitical factors. In spite of the fact that the official end of the Cold War has 
rendered the nuclear arms race between the U.S. and USSR obsolete, the fact that the 
U.S. and Russia have refused to completely dismantle their nuclear arsenals reveals 
how there are convoluted and underlying factors in the U.S.-Russian security 
relationship. Unraveling the military-technical factors will necessitate a thorough 
examination of the issue of missile defense, which became a contentious issue during 
George W. Bush’s administration and continues to remain a sticking point for Russia. 
Russia has consistently maintained its view that one of the greatest impediments 
against further nuclear arms control is the issue of missile defense: “...Russian 
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expectations about the future of New START were specifically related to the issue of 
missile defense”3  
The geopolitical factors obstructing nuclear arms control are the 2014 
Ukrainian conflict and, to a lesser extent, the 2011 Syrian Civil War. The reasoning 
behind the selection of these two case studies is that they represent both direct and 
indirect security dilemmas for Russia and the United States and have been the greatest 
source of tension between the two countries during the Obama administration: “These 
tensions have been compounded and exacerbated in recent months in the wake of the 
ongoing war in Ukraine, and now increasingly by events in Syria as well.”4 Greater 
analytical weight will be placed on the Ukrainian conflict, which is situated in a 
geopolitical hotspot between Europe and Russia. The Ukrainian conflict presents a 
more direct geographical and existential security threat to Russia. Furthermore, the 
Ukrainian conflict has implications for the NATO alliance, which ties it to the U.S.’s 
strategic interest. The events of the Ukrainian conflict had a direct and immediate 
impact on U.S.-Russian strategic relations and the Russian annexation of Crimea can 
be pinpointed as the turning point in solidifying the U.S.-Russian estrangement into a 
permanent rift.  
                                                
3 Cimbala, Stephen J. “U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reductions: Nonlinear Challenges, 
Practical Opportunities.” Foreign Policy Research Institute Elsevier Ltd., 9 Aug. 2013, pp. 
574–594., doi:doi: 10.1016/j.orbis.2013.08.005, 576. 
4 Futter, Andrew. “War Games redux? Cyberthreats, US–Russian strategic stability, and new 




The deterioration in U.S.-Russian relations as a result from the events in 
Ukraine spilled-over into other geopolitical conflicts. Although the 2011 Syrian Civil 
War began before the 2014 Ukrainian conflict, Syria had only a minor impact on U.S.-
Russian strategic relations during the early onset of the Syrian Civil War. It was only 
after relations reached an all-time low due to Ukraine that Syria became an 
increasingly contentious issue between the U.S. and Russia. Given that the Syrian Civil 
War presents less of a direct and tangible threat to Russia and the United States, it can 
only be regarded as an indirect and subsequent geopolitical factor contributing to the 
U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control impasse.  
 In light of the fact that no nuclear weapons have been deployed in either of 
these conflicts to date, the research method of this thesis will examine how events in 
Ukraine and Syria have contributed to reviving the U.S.-Russian strategic rivalry and 
therefore influencing each country’s nuclear policy. This thesis will also operate under 
the definition of strategic rivalry as the following: “Strategic rivalry among major 
powers exists when one or more great powers see one or more other major powers as 
the primary national security threat, focus their defense effort on them, and form 
alliances against them.”5 In the case of the United States and Russia, the defining 
element of their strategic rivalry has been nuclear weapons, as nuclear weapons were 
the distinguishing characteristic of the U.S.-Soviet strategic rivalry during the Cold 
War. Therefore, although the term strategic rivalry can encompass a range of security 
                                                
5 Legvold, Robert. Return to Cold War. Polity, 2016, 22. 
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issues, this thesis will focus on the status of nuclear arms control cooperation as the 
most important aspect of U.S.-Russian strategic relations. 
Research Question 
The research question driving this thesis is: what are the main factors hampering the 
prospects for future U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control cooperation? This thesis 
proposes that the lack of impetus in nuclear arms control cooperation can be attributed 
to both military-technical and geopolitical factors, in the form of disagreements over 
missile defense and clashing geopolitical policy agendas in Ukraine and Syria.  
In order to analyze the impact of these factors on nuclear arms control, the 
literature review will delve into the theoretical and historical framework of U.S.-
Russian (formerly Soviet) strategic arms control cooperation. The theoretical 
framework will adopt the theories of realism, notably John Mearsheimer and Kenneth 
Waltz’s neorealist theories. The historical framework will delve into the historical 
context behind the evolution of U.S.-Russian strategic arms control, starting from 
before the end of the Cold War and leading up to the ratification and implementation of 
the New START treaty in 2011. Understanding the historical context will provide the 
framework to analyze contemporary factors that are influencing U.S.-Russian nuclear 
arms control, namely missile defense and the emerging geopolitical strategic rivalry 
between the U.S.-Russia from the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and discordant 
policy agendas in Syria. 
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Given that these conflicts are still ongoing and continue to aggrieve relations 
today, for the purpose of clarity and brevity, this thesis will focus the bulk of its 
analysis on the period spanning from the George W. Bush administration until the end 
of the Obama administration. During the George W. Bush administration, the issue of 
missile defense was one of the most significant disagreements between the United 
States and Russia. Although missile defense continued to plague the relationship 
during the Obama administration, the focus quickly shifted to the geopolitical clash in 
Ukraine and to a lesser extent in Syria. As of current, it is too premature to incorporate 
the policies of Donald Trump into this thesis and would require too much speculation. 
Hence, the timeframe that will be examined in this thesis will focus mainly on the 
Obama administration up until the end of 2016. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review will consist of two main sections divided into theoretical and 
historical parts. In order to provide a solid theoretical framework to analyze the case 
studies, the theory of realism will be briefly outlined to provide a guiding framework 
to understanding the foreign policy doctrines behind U.S. and Russian nuclear policy 
and also the strategic rivalry between the two countries. In addition, the distinction 
between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons (also known as “tactical”) will be 
succinctly described in order to clarify the terms of arms control negotiation. 
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The second part of the literature review of this thesis will look into the 
historical context behind the evolution of U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control. This part 
will conduct a chronological overview of the evolution of strategic arms control 
cooperation divided into four parts: (1) the first part will examine the period from the 
1972 SALT I Interim Agreement until the end of the Cold War in 1991; (2) the second 
part will pick up from the 1991 START Treaty until the end of Clinton administration 
in 2000; (3) the third part will focus on the 2002 Moscow (SORT) Treaty until the end 
of the George W. Bush administration; (4) finally, the fourth part will focus on the 
2010 New START Treaty until the end of the Obama administration in 2016.  
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework of this thesis will draw from the major realist and neorealist 
works of Hans Morgenthau, offensive realism by Kenneth Waltz, and defensive 
realism by John Mearsheimer. The neorealist framework developed by Waltz and 
Mearsheimer is crucial to framing U.S.-Russian nuclear relations today.  
         The decision to use a realist framework as opposed to a constructivist or an 
institutionalist framework is based on the assumption that nuclear weapons are 
inherently strategic weapons, and therefore to analyze them in a constructivist or 
institutionalist lens, although necessary for a holistic understanding, would not provide 
the best tools to analyze the nature of the strategic arms control partnership between 
the United States and Russia. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that the 
U.S.-Russian strategic arms control partnership is not solely driven by realist factors. It 
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is also driven by institutionalist factors, such as the international nuclear regime 
codified most aptly by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and constructivist 
factors, namely President Obama’s attempt to recast the ideological foundation of the 
strategic partnership into a partnership of peace and mutual nuclear reduction. 
However, realist factors continue to trump institutionalist and constructivist factors as 
the United States and Russia continue to view each other as strategic rivals, especially 
after the souring in relations from the 2014 Ukrainian conflict.  
Despite realism encompassing a wide-ranging span of theories, this thesis will 
concentrate on the three most influential scholars in the school of realism: Hans 
Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and John Mearsheimer. The works of each scholar will 
be briefly reviewed in the following sections.  
 Morgenthau is best known for proposing that “politics and society in general, 
are governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” as defined by a 
Hobbesian state of nature in which survival is based on a self-help basis in world 
operating under anarchy.6 In Morgenthau’s classical realism, “interest as defined by 
power” is the modus operandi for understanding the behavior of states and it is futile to 
look for moral or ethical motivations behind the behavior of states.   
 Kenneth Waltz expands Morgenthau’s classical realism by invoking three 
images of analysis: the first image of the individual, the second image of state, and the 
                                                
6 Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth 
Edition, Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, 4. 
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third image of the international system. According to Waltz, the international system is 
defined by the principles of realism in that under the conditions of anarchy, the 
strategies of other states need to be taken into account in the formulation of one’s own 
strategy: “In international politics there is no authority effectively able to prohibit the 
use of force. The balance of power among states becomes a balance of all the 
capacities, including physical force that states choose to use in pursuing their goals.”7 
Therefore, the U.S.-Russian strategic rivalry is inherently an international balance of 
power struggle between the two greatest nuclear states. Waltz’s balance of power 
theory provides the foundation for defensive realism, in that “the first concern of states 
is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system.”8 Under the 
assumptions of defensive realism, states are not aggressive in seeking to maximize 
their power in the international system; rather states are cautious and seek to build up 
their defensive capabilities and maintain the status quo. 
 On the other hand, Mearsheimer proposes the counter to defensive realism, 
known as offensive realism. Mearsheimer argues that states are always seeking to 
maximize their power and attain hegemony, and status quo powers are difficult to find. 
The international “system is populated with great powers that have revisionist 
intentions at their core.”9 Following this logic, in offensive realism, absolute power is 
                                                
7 Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw Hill (1979) p. 126 
http://www.drmalikcikk.atw.hu/wp_readings/mearsheimer.pdf, 205. 
8 Ibid, 126. 




not as important as relative power. During the Cold War, the objective was to amass a 
greater nuclear arsenal that was measured according to the relative size of your rival’s 
arsenal. 
 Having briefly outlined the core tenets of the realist framework, the next 
section will explain concisely the specific way realism has manifested itself in aspects 
of the U.S.-Russian relationship, namely the strategic rivalry between the two 
countries. The existence of a strategic rivalry, which developed in the waning days of 
the end of World War II until it reached the full-blown rivalry of the Cold War, is the 
most straightforward way to measure how realist perceptions of hard power shape 
relations. 
U.S.-Russian strategic rivalry  
 In the realist framework, the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War was a textbook 
example of strategic rivalry: “The original Cold War between the United States and the 
Soviet Union did satisfy handsomely the criteria of a strategic rivalry. Each saw the 
other as the main threat. Each wielded massive conventional forces and amassed vast 
arsenals of nuclear weapons specifically designed for the other.”10  
 However, it is important to distinguish the difference between nuclear weapons 
and conventional weapons in terms of the balance of power: 
Realist theories of international politics assume that states seek to 
maximize their power relative to other actors, and especially 
against rivals for regional or international hegemony. However, 
                                                
10 Levgold, 24. 
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nuclear weapons do not “add up” in the same way that 
conventional forces do: more are not necessarily better, for 
deterrence or for crisis management. An imbalance in nuclear 
strike capabilities between larger and smaller powers might 
motivate the smaller power from acquiring a nuclear first strike 
capability. Rational deterrence theory also assumes that political 
leaders make cost-benefit decisions whether to attack on the basis 
of expected utilities for the “winner” of a nuclear exchange and 
expected disutilities for the “loser.” However, nuclear conflicts 
are as likely to begin from a flawed bargaining process in which 
states misestimate enemy intentions, capabilities, and mindsets.11  
 
The fact that nuclear weapons have their own unique dynamic can help us understand 
why states seem to place greater value on their nuclear arsenals. Returning to the 
research question driving this thesis- what can account for the breakdown in U.S.-
Russian nuclear arms control cooperation today- the perspective of the United States 
must be examined separately from Russia’s perspective. 
For the United States, the reasons for holding on to its nuclear arsenal are 
twofold in the realist framework: 
First, the international security environment remains dangerous 
and unpredictable, and has grown more complicated since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union...Second, nuclear weapons 
continue to play unique roles in supporting U.S. national security. 
Although not suited for every 21st century challenge, nuclear 
weapons remain an essential element in modern strategy.12 
 
The inability to relinquish the important role nuclear weapons continue to play in 
U.S. national security policy has endowed nuclear weapons their enduring 
                                                
11 Cimbala, The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy, 20. 
12 Pelligrini, Dominick R. Nuclear Weapons' Role in 21St Century U.S. Policy. Nova Science 
Publishers, Inc, 2010. Weapons of Mass Destruction Series. EBSCOhost, 41. 
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strategic value. Therefore, from the U.S. point of view, nuclear weapons have 
become an indispensable part of U.S. defense strategy in a world facing ever-
evolving security challenges. 
From Russia’s perspective, its nuclear arsenal still represents its lifeline in a 
multipolar world no longer defined by the bipolar rivalry of the U.S. and USSR. The 
Russian military has not been able to keep up with the advanced technological 
innovation of the U.S military, and therefore cannot completely abandon its nuclear 
arsenal:  
Postmodern Russia seeks to modernize its military and move 
beyond the nuclear dependency of the Cold War. But until it can 
catch up with post–Desert Storm conventional high-technology 
weapons of the kind deployed by the United States and NATO, 
Russia must rely on its nuclear deterrent, which now covers more 
possible scenarios than during the Cold War.13  
 
It is the asymmetry in conventional power that feeds contemporary Russian 
insecurities today. Given that the United States far outstrips Russia in conventional 
forces, Russia’s primary instinct is to cling onto its nuclear arsenal to maintain its 
status as a great power. In addition, the notion of parity still plays an essential role in 
shaping Russian perceptions of the utility of their nuclear arsenal and is quite useful in 
analyzing Russia’s nuclear policy today: 
... the logic of the Russian defense policy, which determines 
structure of the military-industrial complex, did not change since 
                                                
13 Cimbala, Stephen J. and Peter Jacob Rainow. Russia and Postmodern Deterrence: Military 
Power and Its Challenges for Security. vol. 1st ed, University of Nebraska Press, 2007. Issues 
in Twenty-first Century Warfare. EBSCOhost, 
search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=388649&site=ehost-live, xvi.  
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the Cold War. Today more factors objectively unite Russia and 
the US in the world rather than separates them. However, 
Moscow is still committed to maintaining a parity (or at least an 
illusion of parity) with the US in the strategic nuclear sphere and 
regards it as a criteria for its military security and maintenance of 
a great power status.14 
 
In summary, viewing U.S.-Russian relations through a realist framework provides 
perspective on why nuclear weapons continue to remain relevant today, even after the 
end of the Cold War arms race. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to understand how arms control treaties fit in the 
realist framework. Despite being generally understood to be tools of negotiation with 
the aim of diminishing security dilemmas, arms control treaties can sometimes 
exacerbate security dilemmas as much as they seek to diminish them. For example, 
given Russia’s inferior conventional power, reductions in its nuclear arsenal would 
leave Russia in an overall weaker position. In order to avoid this, it is crucial to have 
thorough knowledge of the technical requirements of maintaining a valid nuclear 
arsenal:  
For the time being, New START only reproduces the old logic of 
balances and counterbalances, because there are no discussions in 
Russia about criteria for determining a sufficient and optimal 
level of its nuclear arsenal, or about factors that should now 
determine the country’s nuclear arms policy. Numerous myths 
and enormous Cold War inertia suggest an outdated 
understanding of what quantitative and qualitative levels of 
strategic nuclear forces meet the task of ensuring national 
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security, foreign-policy prestige and a place in the international 
system.15 
 
Delving into the technical requirements of maintaining an optimal level of nuclear 
forces for strategic security requires a quick explanation of the difference between 
strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which will follow in the next section. 
Strategic vs. tactical nuclear weapons 
In the interest of clarity, it is necessary to define what is meant by the terms “strategic” 
and “tactical” nuclear weapons. Strategic refers to the idea that: “Strategic nuclear 
weapons that can threaten an adversary’s valued targets from afar are, and are likely to 
remain, essential for holding particularly well-protected targets at risk for deterrence 
purposes.”16 Therefore, strategic nuclear weapons are meant for high-yield destruction 
in warfare to achieve swift victory.  
The counterpart to strategic weapons are nonstrategic weapons. Nonstrategic 
nuclear weapons refer to low-yield nuclear weapons such as “shorter-range ballistic 
and cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads.”17 In short, the main difference 
between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons is their yield and intention. For 
offensive, longer-range reach, and higher yield weapons, there is a definitive strategic 
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value. Low-yield, shorter range missiles with nuclear warheads for defensive purposes 
are seen as nonstrategic.  
The matter of defining nonstrategic and strategic nuclear weapons is crucial for 
further arms control cooperation as “Washington and Moscow have yet to agree on a 
common, technical definition of tactical nuclear weapons…”18 Even so, the prospect of 
negotiations on nonstrategic nuclear weapons is a dim possibility:  
Negotiations on nonstrategic nuclear weapons are unlikely for 
three reasons: verification, inequality, and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). There simply are no good ways to 
verify limits on numbers of warheads, yet without verification, 
treaties are simply unilateral declarations under another name. An 
equally daunting problem is the disparity between the nonstrategic 
arsenals of the United States and Russia, with the Russian arsenal 
substantially larger, although authoritative public numbers are 
lacking on both sides. Finally, in any such negotiation the 
Russians would certainly seek the removal of the remaining U.S. 
nuclear weapons (all bombs) from Europe.19  
 
In conclusion, the theoretical framework of realism is most suitable for analyzing the 
evolution of the U.S.-Russian strategic rivalry, but the unique dynamic of nuclear 
weapons and the lack of a common technical definition of tactical nuclear weapons 
does not fit neatly into the realist framework. To truly understand the role nuclear 
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weapons played in shaping U.S.-Russian relations, a historical overview of U.S.-
Soviet/Russian nuclear arms control cooperation is needed. The next section will probe 
deeper into the historical context of U.S.-Russian (formerly Soviet) strategic arms 
control cooperation.  
 
Historical Framework 
As mentioned previously, the historical framework will provide the crucial context to 
understanding how the U.S.-Russian strategic arms control partnership has evolved 
into its current state. A chronological outline of the major developments of the 
strategic arms control partnership will be divided into the following four time periods: 
(1) The 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement until the end of the Cold War in 1991; (2) 
The 1991 START Treaty until 2000; (3) The 2002 Moscow SORT Treaty until the end 
of the George W. Bush administration in 2007; (4) Finally, the 2010 New START 
Treaty until the end of the Obama administration in 2016. For a visual reference of the 
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A summary of all the major arms control agreements produced between the United 










U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Agreements 
Treaty/Agreement Year Format Status 
ABM Treaty 1972 Treaty 
Entered into force in 1972; 
lapsed after U.S. withdrawal 
in 2002 




Entered into force in 1972, 
due to remain in force for 5 
years 
SALT II 1979 Treaty Did not enter into force 
INF 1987 Treaty 
Entered into force in 1988; 
reductions complete in 1991; 
remains in force 
START 1991 Treaty 
Entered into force in 1994; 
reductions complete in 2001; 
lapsed in December 2009 





U.S.-Russian Arms Control Agreements 
Treaty/Agreement Year Format Status 
START II 1993 Treaty Did not enter into force 
Moscow Treaty 
(SORT) 2002 Treaty 
Entered into force in 2003; 
would have lapsed in 2012, but 
lapsed on EIF of New START 
New START 2010 Treaty Entered into force in 2011 







(1) 1972-1990: SALT I Interim Agreement 
This period will cover the 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement until the end of the Cold 
War in 1991. During this period, the Cold War rivalry between the United States and 
the Soviet Union was in full swing, and dominated the international system. The 
ideological divisions between the two countries, which can be defined as the 
antagonism between democracy and communism, evolved into a global competition 
for influence, spanning several regions and encompassing several conflicts, including 
the Vietnam War and Korean War. The central pillar of the strategic rivalry between 
the United States and Soviet Union was the destructive strategic arms race, namely 
nuclear weapons. Even in the earlier stages of the U.S.-Soviet strategic rivalry, there 
was a mutual recognition for the need of some sort of arms control framework to curb 
the increasingly unsustainable and risky arms race. The unique destructive capabilities 
of nuclear weapons were recognized by both American and Soviet leaders and both 
countries ratified the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). 
 Despite the mutual recognition that some sort of process for formal arms 
control agreements was needed even starting from the 1950s, early attempts at arms 
control negotiations floundered due to the deep distrust and suspicion between the two 
countries and also due to domestic political pressure to uphold the arms race: “Arms 
control was impossible in the late 1950s, given the mutual suspicions of both the 
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United States and Soviet Union over each other’s intentions.”20 In addition, the Soviet 
military strongly resisted any notion of placing limits on their nuclear arsenal given 
their inability to surpass the size of the U.S. arsenal and doggedly pursued their goal of 
reaching “deep parity,” which entailed that the “Soviet Union not only match 
America’s intercontinental capabilities, but block its advantages in projecting military 
power around the Soviet frontier.”21 
Therefore, it was not until the Nixon administration reached out in 1969 to 
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev that serious arms control talks began. Despite strong 
objections from the Soviet military leadership, Brezhnev was more interested in 
pursuing a foreign policy of détente and lessening the economic burdens of the 
military. Brezhnev met Nixon at the negotiation table in Helsinki and after years of 
negotiation, the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Interim Agreement was 
signed in 1972.  
The essential aim of the SALT I agreement was to place a limit on the number 
of delivery systems and anti-ballistic missile systems in order to scale back the arms 
race. SALT I was seen as a work in progress and hence deemed an “interim 
agreement.” Negotiations on contentious issues, such as whether U.S. forces outside of 
the continental U.S. should be included in the talks, continued until the SALT II 
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interim agreement was finally reached in 1978. SALT II was focused on fourth-
generation intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM):  
The aim of the negotiations was to set an outer limit on the 
number of delivery vehicles and warheads acceptable to both 
sides. The United States attempted to leave itself open to field 
new cruise missiles outside the treaty, while the Soviet Union 
attempted to protect its flexibility in modernizing its missile force 
by resisting U.S. efforts to limit the development of new 
missiles.22  
 
However, the success of reaching the SALT II agreement was short-lived, as the U.S. 
Senate rejected its ratification. There was growing discontent on the American side 
regarding the SALT negotiations, as the talks did not stop Soviets from developing 
another generation of more advanced missiles. Therefore, prospects for continuing 
arms control talks faced opposition from conservative political factions, who believed 
that “the arms-control treaties had stalemated American strategic modernization, while 
the Carter administration was ignoring the scope and intent of the vigorous Soviet 
program.”23 
By the 1980s, Soviet-American arms control efforts hit a rough patch and 
mutual distrust between the two countries spiked again. The most obvious cause was 
President Reagan’s 1983 proposal for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 
nicknamed “Star Wars.” The SDI proposal sought the installation of a large nuclear 
shield that could block a potential incoming nuclear attack. The Soviets were naturally 
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quite distressed about the SDI proposal: “As former U.S. Defense Secretary and 
Director of Central Intelligence Robert M. Gates has noted: SDI was a Soviet 
nightmare come to life.”24 SDI was a painfully stark reminder to the Soviets of their 
inability to keep up with the fast-pace of American technology and its vast economic 
resources: “SDI therefore presented to the Soviet leadership a two-sided threat of 
military obsolescence and of economic stress.”25 
By 1985, the Soviet Union, with new leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the helm, 
re-approached the United States in seeking a treaty to constrain intermediate nuclear 
forces (INF). By 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev were able to reach an agreement, called 
the INF Treaty. The INF Treaty marked the first time the USSR and USA were 
obligated to destroy the INF portions of their existing nuclear arsenal, but Gorbachev 
was not successful in seeking further concessions from the U.S. In the eyes of the 
Soviet military leaders, the INF Treaty was massively disadvantageous for the USSR. 
Not only did Gorbachev fail to link INF to SDI, but as part of the verification process, 
he also allowed the USSR to be open to “on-site inspections inside the USSR itself for 
the first time.”26 Yet Gorbachev’s concessions went a long way in defusing hostilities 
between the two countries and creating faith in arms control efforts. 
In conclusion, the period from 1972-1990 was pivotal in setting in place the 
arms control negotiations framework between the United States and Soviet Union. 
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SALT I and SALT II were the first steps in seeking to place limits on the size of the 
strategic forces, while the INF Treaty went a step beyond in requiring the reductions of 
forces. Although Soviet-American relations suffered from ups and downs, the most 
important achievement of this period was the mutual recognition that the arms race was 
unsustainable and fiscally irresponsible. By the end of the 1980s, when the political 
stability of the Soviet Union became increasingly shakier and its economic troubles 
worsened, two U.S. senators, Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, proposed the Nunn-Lugar 
Act, which created the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to secure nuclear 
materials management across the Soviet region. The 1991 Nunn-Lugar Act would 
prove to be crucial for the next decade, after the fall of the Soviet Union plunged the 
region into turmoil, as the priority for both the United States and newly established 
Russian Federation became “removing nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Ukraine, decommissioning nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in Russia, 
and securing weapons-grade nuclear materials throughout the former Soviet Union.”27 
The next section will focus on arms control negotiations after the fall of the Soviet 
Union until the end of 2000. 
(2) 1991-2000: 1991 START Treaty 
Renewed efforts at arms control cooperation came in the form of the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START), which was signed in July 1991. START went a step 
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beyond, as “This arms-control treaty was the first to codify an actual reduction in the 
size of the nuclear arsenals on both sides, down to 1,600 delivery systems and 6,000 
warheads.”28 However, the details of implementing the Treaty were interrupted by the 
dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union months later. 
The Soviet Union’s collapse in the last days of December 1991 created a state 
of confusion and uncertainty, and the Soviet Strategic Missile Force (RVSN) was hit 
harder than any other branch of the Soviet military, especially since the Soviet Union 
had spread its nuclear forces across the region. “The newly formed Russian republic 
took over the control of the strategic nuclear forces, most of which were on Russian 
soil. But a significant fraction of the missile and bomber forces were at bases in the 
newly independent republics. As a result, Russia lost control of nearly a quarter of the 
ICBM force- 23.9 percent of all launchers, including some of the most recent fourth-
generation systems.”29 
Negotiating and ensuring the removal of nuclear forces from the territory of 
former Soviet states was the most urgent task in the immediate aftermath of the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. The United States was eager to aid the new Russian 
state in securing its nuclear arsenal across the region. Both Kazakhstan and Belarus 
obliged Russia’s request to return the nuclear forces, yet Ukraine was a much trickier 
case and required the United States to step in and offer significant incentives:  
                                                
28 Zaloga, 222. 
29 Ibid, 215. 
	
	 26	
The United States tied aid and good relations to gradual 
denuclearization and pledged an aid package of $700 million. 
With promises of U.S. support, the Ukrainian parliament ratified 
the START I treaty and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT) in November 1993. This was a critical step in the 
dismantlement of the strategic-missile force in Ukraine.30 
 
By 1993, the second component of START, known as START II, was 
negotiated and signed by Russia and the United States. START II sought deeper cuts, 
especially the elimination of “land-based missiles with MIRV warheads and specified a 
further reduction of warheads to 3,500. The two treaties aimed at eliminating about 
two-thirds of the nuclear firepower that existed at the end of the Cold War.”31 The 
motivating factors for Russia in the START negotiations were twofold: to provide an 
example to former Soviet countries (especially Ukraine) that Russia was serious in 
reducing its nuclear arsenal and also financial reasons in that Russia could not maintain 
the costs of its nuclear forces. While Russia was still processing its post-Soviet 
identity, Russian nuclear doctrine became open for debate:  
the factors driving Russia to restructure and reduce its forces do 
not necessarily entail Russia's complete implementation of the 
START II treaty. Since the treaty was signed, debates over 
doctrine and force restructuring have emerged that suggest that 
alternative reductions and force structures may be more congenial 
to the Russian strategic community and military.32  
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For a comprehensive overview of the stipulations of the START I and START II 





 Lepingwell, John W.R. “Start II and the Politics of Arms Control in Russia.”  
 
 Therefore, the negotiations of the START I and START II Treaties do not 
provide a full picture of the state of U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control cooperation 
during this period, as there were many obstacles hindering implementation, 
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“principally, the unsettled political environment in Russia.”33 It is worthwhile to delve 
into the Russian domestic political environment at the time, as this period marks a 
transition period in Russian foreign policy, which has impacted the arms control 
negotiation process. Notably, during this period, it is possible to discern a change in 
outlook from the part of the Russians:  
The shift from a strongly pro-Western orientation to a more 
"realist" stance, based on a reassessment of Russian geopolitical 
interests, has increased strains in U.S.-Russian relations. Driving 
this process has been an underlying shift in the Russian polity, as 
the hardships of reform have triggered a resurgence of Russian 
nationalism and distrust of the West.34 
Coupled with this paradigm shift in Russian foreign policy doctrine were serious issues 
of funding and personnel for the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) (the successor to the 
RVSN), which have led to concerns about the fitness and quality of Russia’s nuclear 
arsenal: “the division of the defense industrial complex, combined with reduced 
defense budgets and aging missiles, has led to difficulties in the maintenance of 
existing systems.”35                                       
  In addition, the Russian military leadership and politicians were re-examining 
their nuclear doctrine. Yeltsin’s 1993 release of Russian military doctrine principles 
revealed an indefinite reversal of the policy of nuclear no first use (NFU), which had 
been in place for decades. Concerned about the ring of NATO-allied states around its 
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vicinity, Russia withdrew its NFU policy against states that are in an alliance with a 
nuclear state or possess their own nuclear weapons.36 
In the end, START II never entered into force, despite the Clinton 
administration’s efforts: “The administration was, however, unable to make much 
headway on further arms control, largely because domestic Russian politics and 
Russia’s increasing opposition to other American policies stymied further 
negotiations.”37 The complex nature of Russia’s struggle with its post-Soviet identity 
in domestic and foreign politics became tied to the arms control process:  
Here again, the dual nature of the Soviet legacy is evident, for 
while Russia inherited commitments to arms control, it also 
inherited the Soviet Union's aspirations to superpower status and a 
lingering distrust of the West. These tensions in both domestic 
and foreign policy are evident in the case of the START II treaty, 
and may well be exacerbated as Russian politicians prepare for 
elections in 1995 and 1996.38  
The arrival of Vladimir Putin onto the Russian political scene at the end of the 
twentieth century would set Russia on an independent course diametrically opposed to 
the West and reshape the arms control partnership. 
   (3) 2002-2007: Moscow SORT Treaty 
The 2000 Russian presidential election of Vladimir Putin and the election of George 
W. Bush in the 2000 U.S. presidential election brought two new leaders into office 
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with strong foreign policy agendas. Moreover, the beginning of the twenty-first 
century ushered in new security challenges that would force each country to confront 
and re-evaluate their nuclear doctrine.  
The most notable achievement in arms reduction during this period was the 
2002 Moscow Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). SORT was negotiated 
in a completely different geopolitical security environment, even though the Treaty 
called for continuing the trend in reducing the number of nuclear weapons. The Treaty 
obligated that operationally deployed warheads be limited to 1,700-2,200 each, but had 
no verification mechanisms and allowed each country to determine the composition of 
their nuclear arsenal as long as it complied with the limits.  
Russia was far more involved in pushing for the Moscow Treaty- the Bush 
administration was far less enthusiastic. Bush did not subscribe to the importance of 
nuclear treaties, which he viewed as outdated and counterproductive:  
The Bush camp signaled that it considered nuclear arms treaties to 
be relics of the Cold War era, which the United States no longer 
needed, even if Russia had not recognized this reality. The 
dismissive attitude toward arms control was a source of anxiety 
for Russia, because its nuclear arsenal was the basis of its 
remaining great-power status and arms control treaties were one 
of the few areas where Russia and the United States were still 
equals.39  
 
From the past experiences of negotiating arms control treaties with the Soviet Union, 
the bureaucratic and time-consuming process of arms control treaty negotiations was 
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seen as cumbersome and ineffective, yet forgoing the negotiations proved to be more 
anxiety-invoking for the Russians, who wanted to maintain their superpower status:  
For Russia, strategic nuclear arms talks have been key to ensuring 
that it could maintain parity with the United States, particularly in 
the post-Cold War period. By negotiating treaties that forced both 
sides’ numbers down, Russia could build a force it could afford 
while maintaining deterrence against the United States and status 
as its equal as a nuclear superpower. Arms control also made 
possible a Russian voice in how the United States built and 
deployed its forces and provided a forum in which it could 
articulate its preferences and concerns, even if it did not always 
attain all of its aims.40  
 
Nonetheless, despite Russia’s insistence otherwise, the Bush administration maintained 
its stance of arms control negotiations as counterproductive: “To the contrary, 
Administration officials argued that formal arms control negotiations represented an 
adversarial process between the United States and Russia and they were no longer 
appropriate…”41 
In addition, on December 13, 2001, President George W. Bush announced his 
decision to withdraw the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 
which had been in place since 1972. This marked a major reversal in arms control 
cooperation, and Moscow became wary of the Bush administration’s increasingly 
assertive foreign policy. The Russian response was swift and decisive: “Russia, for its 
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part, declared itself no longer bound by the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START II) in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.”42 
 The overarching reason why the Bush administration turned its focus away 
from arms control cooperation was due to the rapidly changing geopolitical 
environment. The 2001 September 11 World Trade terrorist attacks left Americans 
reeling and grasping for some semblance of security. President George W. Bush 
embarked on a hawkish campaign against global terrorism and his “you’re either with 
us, or against us” attitude and resolute use of unilateral force proved to be extremely 
polarizing.  Furthermore, the strategic value of nuclear weapons was seen as too 
valuable to discard in a time of uncertainty when fears of another terrorist attack 
continued to loom large: “When combined with the global war on terrorism and the 
reliance on using U.S. military forces for regime change, the Bush administration was 
seen as much more reliant on nuclear weapons than the actual policy record reflects.”43  
Another element of Bush’s foreign policy was his push for liberal democratic 
values. As the U.S. became increasingly occupied in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the American fight against global terrorism incorporated ideals of democracy and 
freedom. Bush’s anti-terrorist rhetoric wholeheartedly embraced the promotion of 
democracy and freedom worldwide. This was met with uneasy trepidation by Moscow, 
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which still had an uneasy relationship with the concept of democracy. The color 
revolutions in the former Soviet states were a source of anxiety for Russia: 
Precisely because the political system in the post-Soviet states 
resembled that of Russia, the Kremlin felt threatened by these 
revolutions. Post-Soviet Russia viewed politics in the post-Soviet 
states as an extension of its own domestic politics. After all, if 
Ukrainians could take to the streets and overthrow their 
government, so could Russians. The fact that Western NGOs were 
actively promoting civil society and encouraging people to 
demand greater transparency and accountability in their societies 
made it easy for the Kremlin to portray these movements as yet 
another example of American attempts to weaken Russia’s 
influence in its rightful sphere of influence.44  
 
The message of these color revolutions was clear: reform-minded citizens were ready 
to break free from the clutches of Soviet influence and exercise their right to elect their 
government in a transparent and democratic manner. The Rose Revolution in Georgia 
culminated in the peaceful transition of power in January 2004 from close Kremlin ally 
Eduard Shevardnadzeto to the popular and young reformer Mikheil Saakshvili. 
Tensions between Georgia and Russia would eventually escalate into armed conflict in 
the summer of 2008, leading to Russian victory and acknowledgement of the 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in late 2004- triggered by the massive discontent 
from the lack of transparency and corruption during the presidential elections- was 
viewed by Moscow with alarm. Moscow feared losing its sphere of influence in these 
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former Soviet states. These fears would manifest themselves ten years later in the 2014 
Ukrainian conflict, which will be explained in more detail in the case study.  
In summary, it is possible to discern how geopolitical factors began to creep 
into arms control cooperation- with the Bush administration pursuing its unilateral 
foreign policy agenda using force abroad and Moscow viewing the American global 
democracy promotion campaign as antagonistic to its own interests in the former 
Soviet states. It would take the election of Barack Obama to lead arms control 
cooperation back on its course.  
(4) 2010-2016: New START Treaty 
President Barack Obama’s prioritization of U.S.-Russian relations and arms control 
cooperation was a marked change from the previous Bush administration and the 
election of Barack Obama in 2008 reopened the door for nuclear arms control 
cooperation. The Obama administration emphasized its willingness to prioritize the 
trend of nuclear reductions, and unlike the previous Bush administration, embraced a 
more idealist outlook, calling on all nations to begin taking steps towards realizing a 
world without nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the Obama administration viewed 
Russia as a potential partner in this endeavor to achieving nuclear zero- a world 
without nuclear weapons. Unlike his predecessor, Obama’s foreign policy agenda 
ranked nuclear disarmament as a top priority and early on in his presidency, the Obama 
administration attempted to mend relations with the Russians. Obama’s efforts 
happened to coincide with Russia’s desire to seek another arms agreement:  
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Nuclear nonproliferation and arms control- including a 
commitment to an ultimate ‘global zero’- were at the heart of 
Obama’s foreign policy priorities. Signing another arms treaty 
was also a priority for Moscow, partly because a reduction in 
nuclear weapons would free up economic resources to spend on 
other priorities. Equally important was the fact that negotiating an 
arms control agreement with the United States boosted Russia’s 
international prestige and was one of the few areas in which the 
United States and Russia as the world’s two nuclear superpowers 
dealt with each other as equals. Whereas the Bush administration 
denigrated START-type agreements as a Cold War relic, the 
Obama administration embraced them.45  
 
In short, a fortuitous mix of timing, leadership, and concurring agendas set the 
stage for a new chapter of closer nuclear cooperation.  
The result was a new arms control treaty called “New START.” It was signed 
in Prague in April 2010 and represented “the biggest nuclear arms pact in a generation 
and was the first- and arguably the single most important- achievement of the reset.”46 
New START was signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in April 2010 
and the stipulations of the treaty entailed that: “within seven years after the New 
START Treaty goes into effect, the United States and Russia must reduce their 
arsenals to 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and 700 deployed strategic missiles and 
bombers.”47 These grand and sweeping reductions held the promise of a global step 
towards the vision of a world of nuclear zero. The graph below outlines the progress of 
the New START reductions: 
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and Deployed Delivery Vehicles 
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For the Russians, New START was a breakthrough achievement for both 
symbolic and financial reasons:  
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Russian officials viewed New START as a vindication of their 
arguments about the importance of bilateral arms control treaties 
that the Bush administration had belittled. Despite their failure to 
link New START to missile defense, they believed it reinforced 
their claim to great-power status. Moreover, New START was 
economically advantageous because it would enable Russia to 
reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal while maintaining a significant 
nuclear posture.48  
 
At present, more than seven years have elapsed since the signing of New 
START, and it is clear that the promise of New START to pave the way for further 
nuclear arms control cooperation and closer relations has not come to fruition; on the 
contrary, relations have deteriorated to the point where arms control cooperation itself 
is in peril of being consumed by the negative turn in relations. The return of Vladimir 
Putin as president in 2012 also brought back a more skeptical and confrontational 
approach to relations with the United States. Under Putin’s leadership, “Russia views 
with a lot of skepticism the global strategy of nonproliferation and counterproliferation 
declared by the United States, seeing in it a policy based in the practice of double 
standards and an attempt to veil other political, military, and commercial interests, 
including nuclear exports, with the goal of nonproliferation.”49 Putin’s muscular 
foreign policy style clashed greatly with the cautious style of the Obama 
administration, which tended to rely on multilateral approaches.  
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To have a deeper understanding of Russia’s nuclear policy, one must look at 
its ideational roots, which stem from Putin’s leadership style and his vision for Russia: 
“Putin had come into office determined to reverse the humiliating decade of the 1990s, 
guarantee Russia’s territorial integrity and restore Russia’s role as a great power…”50 
Although Putin is first and foremost a pragmatist and recognizes the need to cooperate 
with the West in certain areas such as modernizing the economy and welcoming 
Western investment, in regards to Russian foreign policy, Putin remains fiercely 
independent from the Western worldview. For Putin, restoring Russia’s international 
influence and status as a global superpower requires a foreign policy doctrine with a 
compass fixed firmly in the direction of pursuing its own national interest. The case 
studies will examine Russia’s evolving foreign policy doctrine in greater detail and 




Keeping in mind the theoretical framework and historical context from the literature 
review, the case studies will be examined in the following section. Given that this 
thesis has divided the main causes of stalled arms control cooperation into military-
technical and geopolitical factors, the first case study will be on the military-technical 
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issue of missile defense. Disagreements about missile defense are tied into larger issues 
of NATO and have been a consistent sticking point on the Russian side. Understanding 
how the missile defense issue shapes the greater arms control debate will illuminate the 
Russian perspective and domestic political pressures. 
On the other side, geopolitical factors have complicated the arms control 
process and the two case studies of the 2014 Ukrainian conflict and, by extension, the 
2011 Syrian civil war, will be analyzed for their influence on U.S.-Russian arms 
control cooperation. Both these case studies are still ongoing and unresolved, but their 
impact on arms control cooperation is still important to examine. Although the signing 
of New START in 2010 was seen as a great success, relations in the aftermath have 
been bleak:  
However, and despite the successful negotiation and agreement of 
the New START treaty in 2010, US–Russian strategic relations 
have declined markedly over the subsequent years, reaching a 
nadir perhaps not seen since the Cold War. As a result, trust and 
cooperation have slowly evaporated and the push for further 
bilateral nuclear cuts has therefore naturally stalled.51  
 
In particular, the 2014 Ukrainian conflict can be considered a turning point in 
U.S.-Russian relations. The Russian annexation of Crimea can be pinpointed as the 
spark that ignited the simmering tensions of the U.S.-Russian strategic rivalry into full-
blown hostility.  The Ukrainian case had a more direct impact on the U.S.-Russian 
strategic rivalry due to the fact that Russia was directly involved in Europe’s backyard, 
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which had implications for NATO. The impact of Crimea trickled over into other 
geopolitical conflicts, namely the Syrian conflict. Although the Syrian conflict began 
earlier in 2011, Russian involvement in the Syrian conflict did not escalate until 2015, 
when Putin decided to send military troops to support the Assad regime. The U.S. and 
Russia have been diametrically opposed regarding Syria from the start- with the U.S. 
providing support to the rebel factions and Russia providing crucial support to Bashar 
al Assad. The Syrian case presents a more indirect impact on arms control cooperation, 
but will still be examined to understand the full impact of how Russian actions in 





I. Missile defense disagreements 
One of the most long-standing disagreements in the U.S.-Russian relationship has been 
the issue of missile defense. “Attitudes toward missile defenses are one of the clearest 
examples of a disconnect between U.S. and Russian public postures and perceptions.”52 
The inability of both sides to see eye-to-eye on missile defense has been exacerbated 
by Russia’s insistence on linking missile defense with nuclear arms control. “If the 
linkage between U.S. and NATO plans for European missile defenses and further 
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progress in U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms reductions was not yet a hostage 
relationship, it was clearly a problematic connection.”53  
Furthermore, the issue of missile defense is also complicated by the U.S-led 
NATO alliance structure, which Russia sees as one of its foremost security challenges. 
NATO expansion, another long-standing issue in U.S.-Russian relations, has been 
directly connected to the missile defense issue, especially with the inclusion of Eastern 
European states seeking protection from Russia. Unpacking the missile defense issue 
will illuminate the Russian perspective and also explain a core component of the post-
Cold War U.S.-Russian strategic rivalry. The aim of this case study is to conduct an 
overview of the missile defense issue from the perspectives of both the U.S. and Russia 
in order to piece together how missile defense disagreements impact arms control 
cooperation.  
 Historically, U.S. missile defense systems have always been a source of 
anxiety and distrust for the Soviets. Disagreements about missile defense have spanned 
decades, starting from Reagan’s plans for a missile defense shield in the form of SDI, 
which was eventually abandoned in the crisis of U.S.-Soviet relations during the 
1980s. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Clinton administration also faced hurdles 
in arms control cooperation due to the issue of missile defense but remained committed 
to the ABM Treaty and floated the idea of constructing a “regional theater missile 
                                                




defense (TMD) that could shoot down shorter-range missiles but not long-range 
Russian missiles…. The Clinton administration was interested in developing a TMD 
system that would have enabled Washington to keep the ABM Treaty in place.”54 Even 
though the Clinton administration failed to resolve the missile defense disagreement, 
relations were not seriously damaged by the missile defense issue itself. This would 
change with the election of George W. Bush. 
The arrival of George W. Bush into the White House reopened the debate on 
U.S. missile defense policy: 
The Bush administration came into office determined to jettison 
Cold War-era arms control agreements...Whereas the Clinton 
administration sought ways of reconciling missile defense with 
maintaining the 1972 ABM Treaty, the Bush administration had 
made it clear from the outset that the ABM Treaty was an 
unnecessary impediment to the United States deploying missile 
defense components to fend off a potential attack from Iran or 
North Korea.55   
 
Bush decided to withdraw from the ABM Treaty at the end of 2001. As anticipated, the 
Russians were upset with America’s unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and 
also wanted reassurance: “Fearing that the White House would jettison the other pillar 
of arms control- the START treaty- Putin had told Bush at the Shanghai APEC 
conference in October 2001, ‘I need a treaty.’ So Bush, rejecting the advice of the 
extreme arms control skeptics in his administration, agreed to a new treaty.”56 
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Although the Moscow SORT Treaty was successfully negotiated, Bush would persist 
with his plans for a missile defense system in Europe. 
The core of the disagreement stems from Russia’s insistence that a U.S. 
missile defense system in Europe would undermine Russian security, while the U.S. 
and NATO insist that European-based missile defense systems are only intended to 
counter threats from rogue states such as North Korea and Iran. Yet, Russia continues 
to insist that the presence of a missile defense system has the potential to threaten 
Russia’s second-strike capabilities:  
Russians, however, have long held that the system over time will 
be sufficient to significantly mitigate if not eliminate a Russian 
strategic nuclear second strike, thus its deterrent capacity. 
Russia’s fear is of a future defense capability, even as NATO’s 
planning is directed against a future non-Russian threat.57 
 
From the perspective of the Bush administration, the need for missile defense 
protection from rogue states such as Iran and North Korea was becoming increasingly 
necessary. Hence, plans were drawn to station U.S. Patriot missiles and a radar system 
in Europe, specifically in Poland and the Czech Republic. The selection of these two 
countries was particularly controversial, especially given the history of Soviet invasion 
of these countries: “The Czechs and Poles wanted the missile defense sites because 
they were a physical manifestation of U.S. support, with all that conveyed. As former 
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Warsaw Pact members, their support of America’s project was particularly galling for 
Moscow.”58  
Although the U.S. went as far as to sign agreements with Poland and the Czech 
Republic for the installation of the missile defense shield and deployment of Patriot air 
defense missiles, Russian outcry over the plan stalled its implementation. The U.S. 
proposal for a missile defense system in Europe would prove to be the most 
contentious obstacle hindering further nuclear arms control cooperation: “During 
Bush’s two terms as president, U.S. plans for missile defense- particularly the 
deployment of radars in the Czech Republic and ten interceptors in Poland- became 
one of the most difficult and corrosive problems in U.S.-Russian relations.”59 The 
failure of both sides to reach an understanding of the intended purpose of the European 
missile defense system, compounded by other external factors, such as the U.S.’s 
condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Georgia during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, 
led to a breakdown in communication and cooperation. 
It wasn’t until the transition from the Bush administration to the Obama 
administration that further headway on the issue of missile defense could be made. The 
Obama administration carefully re-evaluated the European missile defense system 
plans and came up with the European Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense 
(EPAA), which consisted of a four-phase plan to introduce missile defense capabilities 
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to Europe. EPAA retracted the Bush administration’s plans for deploying missile 
defense components to the Czech Republic and resisted deployment to Poland until the 
third and fourth phase. The outline of the plan is below: 
Table 4: 
European Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense 
 




Timeframe 2011 2015 2018 2020 











To address regional 
ballistic missile 
threats to Europe 
and deployed U.S. 
personnel and their 
families 




missile threats to 
southern Europe 
To counter short-, 
medium-, and 
intermediate-range 
missile threats to 
include all of 
Europe 












BMD ships with 
SM-3 IA off the 
coast of Spain 
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) 




BMD ships with 
SM-3 IA off the 
coast of Spain; 
Aegis Ashore with 







BMD ships with 
SM-3 IA off the 
coast of Spain; 
Aegis Ashore with 








BMD ships with 
SM-3 IA off the 
coast of Spain; 
Aegis Ashore with 
SM-3 IB/IA in 
Romania and 
Poland 






ship off the coast of 
Spain 
Turkey, Germany, 
ship off the coast of 
Spain, Romania 
Turkey, Germany, 
ship off the coast 
of Spain, Romania, 
Poland 
Turkey, Germany, 
ship off the coast 
of Spain, 
Romania, Poland 




Key: Aegis Ashore = land-based component of the Aegis BMD Systems; AN/TYP-2 (FBM) = Army 
Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance, Model 2 (Forward-based Mode); BMD = ballistic missile 
defense; C2BMC = Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications; ICBM = 
intercontinental ballistic missile; IRBM = intermediate-range ballistic missile; MRBM = medium-range 
ballistic missile  
 
 
Eventually, the Obama administration halted the implementation of phase four of the 
EPAA, but this did not assuage Russian resentment:  
In March 2013, US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced 
plans to modify the original plan for EPAA by abandoning the 
originally planned deployments of SM-3 IIB interceptor missiles 
in Poland by 2022. But this step failed to reassure Russian 
doubters about US and NATO claims that their regional and 
global missile defenses were not oriented against Russia. Russian 
officials reiterated demands for a legally binding guarantee from 
the USA and NATO that Russian strategic nuclear forces would 
not be targeted by the system.60  
  
Russia failed to obtain a written assurance that the EPAA would not be used against 
Russia and negotiations sputtered and eventually broke off. 
Implications for Nuclear Arms Control Cooperation 
The most obvious linkage of missile defense to nuclear arms control is 
manifested in the arms control negotiation process between the two countries. Russia 
has long insisted that nuclear reductions be tied to limitations on missile defense: 
“...Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and his predecessor-successor Vladimir Putin 
have made it clear that Russia’s geostrategic perspective links U.S. and NATO missile 
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defenses to cooperation on other arms control issues.”61 Yet the U.S. has continued to 
treat missile defense as a separate issue from arms control. Although it is clear that a 
mutual understanding on missile defense is an imperative requirement for further 
cooperation on nuclear arms control, there have not been any successful strides 
towards this goal.  
The negotiation of New START Treaty, which does not restrict the U.S. from 
moving ahead with missile defense plans, was another attempt by Russia to tie further 
arms control cooperation to missile defense: “After seeking to link missile defense to 
New START, Russia eventually accepted that the treaty would not limit missile 
defense, although it left open the possibility that, if missile defense deployments went 
ahead, Russia could withdraw from New START.”62  
Missile defense has been a perpetual source of disagreement and tension in 
U.S.-Russian relations, but has not completely stalled arms control cooperation, as 
demonstrated by the signing of the Moscow SORT Treaty and New START Treaty. 
Yet, when combined with the emergence of bitter clashes over geopolitical conflicts in 
Ukraine and eventually Syria, U.S.-Russian relations would deteriorate to the point 
where the entire arms control cooperation framework was in danger of being derailed. 
The next case study will delve into the events of the 2014 Ukrainian conflict and their 
implications for U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control.  
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II.   Ukraine 
Background of the 2014 Ukrainian conflict 
Before analyzing the implications of the present day Ukrainian conflict on U.S.-
Russian relations, it is important to begin with the historical context in order to trace 
the tensions that erupted into the 2014 Ukrainian conflict. Historically, Ukraine has 
wrestled with its national identity and has struggled to find its place between the West 
and Russia for centuries, as the “lands of contemporary Ukraine and the forebears of 
today’s Ukrainians were parceled out among Poland, Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and 
the Habsburg Empire” up until the early 1900s.63 Therefore, the enduring debate on 
Ukraine’s place between the East and West remains an ongoing issue and is 
compounded by the presence of a minority group of ethnic Russians in Ukraine:  
One of the most contentious issues in Ukraine is the extent and 
nature of its integration with the West. Broadly speaking, 
alignment with the West resonates most strongly in central and 
western Ukraine, while support for Russia predominates in the 
south and east. Ukrainians in the east and south are more closely 
connected- culturally, emotionally, and politically- to Russia than 
their fellow citizens are.64 
 
Under this historical backdrop, the series of events that took place after 
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s fateful decision to withdraw Ukraine from 
negotiations with the European Union in November 2013 led to the crisis known as the 
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2014 Ukrainian Conflict. Yanukovych’s decision to move away from the EU and cling 
to Russia proved to be the catalyst for civil unrest, as thousands flooded the streets of 
the capital Kiev to protest. The violent tactics of the riot police acting under the order 
of Yanukovych escalated the protests into a full-scale revolution known as the 
Euromaidan Revolution. By February 2014, the revolution turned deadly, with the 
number of casualties increasing to the point where Yanukovych had no choice but to 
concede his position and seek a truce with the protesters. However, the truce was 
quickly abandoned due to the intensity of the opposition against him, and Yanukovych 
was forced to flee the country on February 22. Yanukovych's departure did not quell 
the revolution, but merely set the stage for further chaos and division.  
 Home to a large majority of Russian speakers, Crimea became the focus of 
international attention after its decision to hold a referendum on secession from 
Ukraine on March 16, 2014, despite the Ukrainian parliament having deemed the 
referendum as unconstitutional. President Putin had already ordered the deployment of 
Russian troops (deployed stealthily as “out of uniform” vacationers) throughout 
Crimea and the southeastern part of Ukraine. It was undoubtedly the presence of these 
troops that sealed Crimea’s fate:  
Vladimir Putin used a methodology of combined soft and hard 
power that we might refer to as ‘military persuasion’ in occupying 
and then annexing Crimea from Ukraine in February and March 
2014. Russia’s form of indirect warfare against Ukraine included 
the use of covert special operations forces, strategic deception, 
disinformation, and fifth column surrogates inside the Ukrainian 
military and police establishments, in addition to local pro-
Russian sympathizers. Putin’s fait accompli in Crimea created a 
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temporary atmosphere of crisis in Europe and prompted a reaction 
from NATO and the European Union that included more assertive 
military exercises by NATO and economic sanction imposed 
against Russia by the United States and European Union.65  
 
After Crimea held a referendum of dubious legality and voted to secede from Ukraine, 
Russia readily accepted Crimea’s request to be annexed on March 18. 
 The controversial annexation of Crimea became the turning point for Russia’s 
relations with the United States. The legality of the Crimean annexation was formally 
deemed to be void by the United Nations General Assembly on March 27 with the 
passing of a non-binding resolution 68/262, which not only declared Crimea’s 
referendum to be invalid, but also called upon “all States to desist and refrain from 
actions aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial 
integrity of Ukraine, including any attempts to modify Ukraine’s borders through the 
threat or use of force or other unlawful means.”66  
 Unfortunately, the violence and use of force did not end with Crimea. Rebels 
in the eastern Donbas region, notably in the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, began 
seizing territory and declaring independence, as the Donetsk’s People’s Republic and 
Luhansk’s People’s Republic. As of February 2017, the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported the estimated number of 
casualties in the region to be over 9,900 and the situation has turned into a full-blown 
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humanitarian crisis: “Countless families have lost members, had members injured, and 
lost property and their livelihoods as parties to the conflict continued to disregard and 
violate international humanitarian law and human rights law”67 















                                                
67 Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine 16 November 2016 to 15 February 2017. 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights , 2017, Report on the 






Map of Eastern Ukraine in 2015 
 
BBC News “Ukraine Conflict: Battles Rage in Donetsk and Luhansk.”  
 
 The failure of the Minsk Agreements, signed in September 2014 and again in 
February 2015, to implement a lasting ceasefire has rendered the Ukrainian conflict an 
ongoing humanitarian and political crisis. The consequences of the Ukrainian conflict 
stretch far beyond its borders. The United States and European Union imposed a series 
of economic sanctions against Russia for its involvement in supporting the rebels and 
the fragmentation of Ukraine. In July 2014, a Malaysia Airlines airplane heading to 
	
	 53	
Amsterdam from Kuala Lumpur was shot down over eastern Ukraine “almost certainly 
by a missile fired by the insurgents at what they had assumed was a military aircraft.”68 
The result was the death of 300 passengers and crew members onboard, which pushed 
the U.S. and Europe to ramp up sanctions against Russia. The sanctions opened up a 
rift between Russia and the West: “Moscow responded to the sanctions with an 
amalgam of nonchalance and defiance, rolling out its own economic penalties and 
threatening more. The sanctions, the suspension of Russia from the G-8 bloc of global 
economic powers, and the cessation of NATO’s political cooperation with Moscow 
shredded the relationship between Russia and the West and threatened the entire post-
Cold War European political-military order”69  
 From the American perspective, Ukraine demonstrated Russia’s increasing 
aggressiveness and territorial ambition, which had been an underlying fear of the U.S. 
since the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Although President Obama had been eager to 
reset relations with Russia at the beginning of his term, the Ukrainian crisis stripped 
away any remnants of goodwill: “...Russian actions in Crimea catapulted U.S.-Russian 
relations into a fourth and ultimate stage of decline.”70 On the other hand, the Russians 
saw U.S. opposition towards its policy in Ukraine as the ultimate demonstration of the 
U.S.’s plan to undermine Russian influence and power:  
Viewed from Moscow, Ukraine was the final proof that the 
United States was bent on marginalizing Russia, pushing it back 
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into a geopolitical cage and transforming the countries on its 
border into bulwarks of US influence. Worse, as the months 
passed, Putin and his inner circle deceived themselves into 
believing the US role in the Ukrainian crisis was not only a threat 
to Russia’s national security but an existential threat to the regime 
itself.71  
 
 Given Ukraine’s geographical location as a buffer zone between Europe and 
Russia, the geopolitical consequences of the Ukrainian conflict invoke NATO and 
inspire flashbacks to the original days of the Cold War:  
The crisis in Ukraine, beginning with Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea and its role in the Donbas war, tripped the wire, and the 
two sides have rushed back to the familiar posture of preparing to 
fight each other, only this time, and in contrast to the situation in 
the last decades of the original Cold War, they are acting out a 
sense of immediacy. Among NATO members a genuine 
nervousness exists that Russia may not stop with whatever its 
objectives are in Ukraine but boldly strike against NATO itself, 
say, by testing the security guarantees in the Baltic region. Among 
Russians the fear grows that the United States has seized on the 
Ukrainian crisis to reconstitute its military power on Russia’s 
border and already itself and NATO to strike Russia where further 
instability elsewhere in the region to provide a pretext…Hence 
the ongoing Ukrainian crisis, with its continuing risk of escalation 
is a large, menacing part of a far graver problem. At the very heart 
of the new Russia-West Cold War, Russia, the United States, and 
its NATO allies are returning to the defining feature of the 
original Cold War: the militarized standoff over the future of a 
divided Europe.72  
 
It is clear that the Ukrainian conflict reignited the embers of the strategic rivalry 
between the United States and Russia. The impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the 
respective nuclear policies of each country will be examined in the next section. 
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 Shifts in Nuclear Policy 
To be able to detect any potential shifts in nuclear policies, it is useful to quickly 
review the status of each country’s nuclear doctrine before the outbreak of the 
Ukrainian conflict. For the United States, the most recent nuclear doctrine can be found 
in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy. Russia 
has similarly published its nuclear doctrine strategy in 2010 and most recently in 2014. 
All of these documents will be briefly examined for their core policy postures. In 
addition, given Russian actions in Crimea, changes in Russian military doctrine will be 
examined for their influence on Russian nuclear doctrine.  
 To establish a baseline reference for U.S. nuclear policy, a brief overview of 
the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review will be conducted. In 2010, the U.S. had undergone a 
comprehensive review of its nuclear strategy and arsenal with the publication of the 
Defense Department’s Nuclear Posture Review Report. In this review, five key 
strategies guiding the U.S. nuclear posture were outlined: (1) “Preventing nuclear 
proliferation and nuclear terrorism; (2) Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in 
U.S. national security strategy; (3) Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at 
reduced nuclear force levels; (4) Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. 
allies and partners; and (5) Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.”73 
These five strategies reflected President Obama’s agenda in reducing U.S. reliance on 
                                                





nuclear weapons and moving towards a national security strategy more suitable for the 
21st century, not the Cold War era.  
In addition, the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship was emphasized and future 
cooperation was the key priority at the time of the publication of the report in 2010:  
Russia remains America’s only peer in the area of nuclear 
weapons capabilities. But the nature of the U.S.-Russia 
relationship has changed fundamentally since the days of the Cold 
War. While policy differences continue to arise between the two 
countries and Russia continues to modernize its still-formidable 
nuclear forces, Russia and the United States are no longer 
adversaries, and prospects for military confrontation have 
declined dramatically. The two have increased their cooperation 
in areas of shared interest, including preventing nuclear terrorism 
and nuclear proliferation.74 
  
The report portrays the working relationship between the U.S. and Russia as one 
focused on advancing the goals of nuclear cooperation, despite policy differences. The 
positive light in which U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation was portrayed reveals how 
much President Obama had hoped to create a sustainable and productive relationship 
with Russia.  
The 2010 report further stresses the need for the establishment of an open and 
sincere dialogue with the Russians regarding the U.S. missile defense programs and 
Russian modernization plans, to prevent misinterpretations of intentions and reduce the 
security dilemma:  
A strategic dialogue with Russia will allow the United States to 
explain that our missile defenses and any future U.S. 
conventionally-armed long-range ballistic missile systems are 
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designed to address newly emerging regional threats, and are not 
intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia. For its part, 
Russia could explain its modernization programs, clarify its 
current military doctrine (especially the extent to which it places 
importance on nuclear weapons), and discuss steps it would take 
to allay concerns in the West about its non-strategic nuclear 
arsenal, such as further consolidating its non-strategic systems in 
a small number of secure facilities deep within Russia.75  
 
In determining the suitable and appropriate level of reductions of the nuclear arsenal, 
the report affirmed that the method of parity, in terms of the number of forces, is no 
longer relevant. This is important to remember, since numerical parity was one of the 
most urgent driving forces during the Cold War arms race: 
Russia’s nuclear force will remain a significant factor in 
determining how much and how fast we are prepared to reduce 
U.S. forces. Because of our improved relations, the need for strict 
numerical parity between the two countries is no longer as 
compelling as it was during the Cold War. But large disparities in 
nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on both sides and among 
U.S. allies and partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining 
a stable, long-term strategic relationship, especially as nuclear 
forces are significantly reduced. Therefore, we will place 
importance on Russia joining us as we move to lower levels.76  
 
 After the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Obama administration released its 
Nuclear Employment Strategy in 2013, which reaffirmed the White House’s 
commitment to scaling back its nuclear arsenal by one-third under New START:  
After a comprehensive review of our nuclear forces, the President 
has determined that we can ensure the security of the United 
States and our allies and partners and maintain a strong and 
credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third 
reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons from the level 
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established in the New START Treaty. The U.S. intent is to seek 
negotiated cuts with Russia so that we can continue to move 
beyond Cold War nuclear postures.77  
 
This indicates that despite bumpy relations with Russia, particularly the Kremlin’s 
2013 decision to grant asylum to NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, the United 
States remained on track to uphold its New START obligations and keep foreign 
policy disagreements from tainting its nuclear relationship with Russia.  
For the Russians, the core element of nuclear doctrine is based on its Cold War 
superpower status. Russian nuclear doctrine remains grounded in the belief that Russia 
must be restored to its former position of international superpower:  
Contemporary Russian strategy and foreign policy are focused on 
restoring the power of the nation in its traditional area of 
influence or dominion and defending Russia from external 
challenge. For a variety of reasons, the current (and most likely 
for the near future) leadership in Russia wishes to regain some 
degree of the suzerainty it enjoyed before the collapse of the 
Soviet empire.78 
  
The official Russian government statement on nuclear doctrine released in 2010 
reiterates this belief that nuclear weapons use is strictly limited to situations in which 
the very existence of the state itself is threatened, which demonstrated that “official 
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statements of Russia’s military doctrine, however, appeared to narrow Russia’s 
declaratory policy on nuclear use.”79  
The Ukrainian conflict marked a significant turning point not only in U.S-
Russian relations, but also in military doctrine, specifically Russian military doctrine. 
As Ven Bruusgaard points out, there were three fundamental changes in Russian 
military doctrine during the Ukrainian crisis, specifically in Crimea: first the “active 
use of subversion and covert actions,” secondly the “overt use of Russian quick-action 
forces,” and finally “non-contact warfare/escalation control.”80 The changes in Russian 
military doctrine are important because of their impact on Russian nuclear policy:  
Russia’s occupation and annexation of Crimea in late February 
and early March 2014 might seem at first blush to have little or 
nothing to do with nuclear weapons. But US and Russian nuclear 
forces and threat perceptions hung over the unfolding crisis, 
creating two kinds of effects. First, Russian President Vladimir 
Putin chose against an acknowledged and overt Russian military 
invasion of Ukrainian state territory. Instead, Russia occupied 
Crimea with clandestine special operations troops, supported by 
already deployed forces on their previously leased base there, and 
combined with political disinformation and strategic deception. 
Second, the behavior of NATO and Russia even in the face of 
further provocations and disputes, including the shoot-down of a 
civilian airliner (Malaysian Airlines MH-17) over eastern Ukraine 
on July 17, was restrained by the awareness on both sides of the 
danger of military escalation in Europe overlaid by nuclear 
weapons deployed there or elsewhere in the states’ arsenals.81  
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Therefore, Russian actions in Ukraine, notably the covert use of its military, strategic 
deception, and the manipulation of information, marked a departure from previous 
Russian military doctrine, to the dismay of the United States.  
 Furthermore, in August 2014, President Putin was explicit in reminding the 
world that Russia was and still is a great power with nuclear capabilities. Addressing a 
youth camp, Putin stated, “Let me remind you that Russia is one of the world’s biggest 
nuclear powers. These are not just words—this is the reality. What’s more, we are 
strengthening our nuclear deterrent capability and developing our armed forces.”82 
Following Putin’s lead, the Russian government officials also emphasized their nuclear 
power:  
During the Ukraine crisis, Russian leadership highlighted Russia’s 
nuclear status to signal that Russia’s stakes were higher than those 
of the West. In addition, Russian diplomats and former officials 
threatened nuclear use against NATO members and partners. 
Russian aircraft ‘buzzed’ vessels, risking accidents, and engaged 
in other hazardous activities.83  
 
Therefore, the combination of changes in Russia’s military doctrine and the linkage 
between military doctrine and nuclear weapons, demonstrate how the Ukrainian 
conflict has fundamentally altered Russian nuclear policy. 
                                                
82 Putin, Vladimir, excerpts from transcript of meeting with Seliger 2014 Forum participants, 
August 29, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46507.  
83 Loukianova Fink, Anya. “The Evolving Russian Concept of Strategic Deterrence: Risks and 
Responses.” Arms Control Association, 10 July 2017, www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-





Yet, understanding exactly the extent to which Russian nuclear policy has been 
altered is much trickier, and in fact, leads to more contradictions than affirmations of 
Russia’s perceived heightened nuclear reliance. Contrary to belief, according to 
officially released statements, Russia has declared its nuclear strategy to have become 
more selective, yet given the secretive nature of nuclear doctrine, determining the 
actual nuclear policy is a challenge:  
The current Russian military doctrine, issued in 2014, states that 
nuclear weapons can be used ‘when the very existence of the state 
is under threat,’ compared to the more expansive conditions laid 
out in 2000. Nonetheless, many nuclear hawks claim that a 
classified document outlining nuclear deterrence strategy, which 
Russia retains in addition to the openly declared military doctrine, 
must spell out the nuclear de-escalation theory. This may be so: 
We have yet to see any leaked or other information on this. An 
alternate interpretation of the lack of official confirmation of the 
de-escalation theory is that this is not, in fact, a dominant aspect 
of Russian warfighting strategy. It would be nonsensical for the 
secret and public documents to blatantly contradict one another.84  
 
 In order to avoid escalating into a wider regional conflict, Russia has been 
careful to steer clear of any indications that it is interested in continuing to assert its 
presence internationally through nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons still remain an 
essential element of Russia’s national security policy and military doctrine, but Russia 
has decided to focus less on the specific conditions of the use of nuclear weapons, and 
instead focus more on their deterrent value:  
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By 2014, official Russian strategy documents reflected this 
development; the main novelty in the 2014 military doctrine was 
its introduction of non-nuclear deterrence: ‘A complex of foreign 
policy, military and military-technical measures aimed at 
preventing aggression against the Russian Federation through 
non-nuclear means.’ At the height of Western post-Crimea stress 
syndrome and nuclear paranoia, the timing of this publication is 
interesting. If ever there was a perfect time to cement the Western 
perception of a Russian “madman” nuclear strategy, this would be 
it. The Russians missed it, opting instead for a concept that 
increased, rather than decreased, the requirements for nuclear 
use.85  
 
Russia has come to embrace the deterrent value of nuclear weapons, which means 
Russia has come to the realization that nuclear parity, in terms of maintaining 
numerical parity by matching the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal in terms of quantity, is 
becoming less and less important.  
In sum, the difference between Russia’s rhetoric, as articulated by Putin’s 
fighting words affirming his vision of a tough Russia, and its official nuclear policy 
released in 2014, is puzzling. While Putin seems to maintain Russian flexibility in 
employing its nuclear option and indeed greatly cherishes the status nuclear weapons 
bestows upon Russia’s international reputation, the cautious increase in the 
requirements for Russian nuclear use in the official strategy memos published in 2014, 
paint a different picture. Russia appears to have been willing to rely on the rhetorical 
power of nuclear weapons, while cautiously limiting the likelihood of their actual 
deployment. Yet, the explicit condition that nuclear first use is still permitted when the 




existence of the state is under threat, has led some scholars to interpret Russia as 
aggrandizing its nuclear policy, given that this was not the case during the Cold War: 
“...Russian military doctrine, unlike Cold War Soviet doctrine, no longer forswears the 
option of nuclear first use in cases of conventional conflicts that could pose a vital 
threat to Russian national interests.”86  
  Implications from the Ukrainian Case Study 
It is without doubt that the Ukrainian conflict has inflicted irreversible damage on 
U.S.-Russian relations. The tensions that had long been simmering since the end of the 
Cold War reached a boiling point in the Ukrainian conflict, with Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea being the turning point. The fact that Russia was able to discreetly invade a 
sovereign country and then annex the territory of Crimea under the guise of a 
democratic referendum was a stunning blow to the United States and completely 
expunged any pretense of the two countries being on friendly terms. The implications 
of the Ukrainian conflict on the overall U.S.-Russian arms control cooperation 
framework can be divided into three categories: (1) the worsening of U.S.-Russian 
relations; (2) the emergence of a more aggressive and assertive Russian foreign policy 
agenda; (3) finally, the push for both countries to modernize their nuclear arsenals. 
 It was only a mere 20 years ago when the United States and Russia had been 
cooperating in Ukraine on the removal of remaining nuclear weapons left from the 
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Soviet era. Today, it is hard to foresee any sort of cooperation between Russia and the 
United States in Ukraine. Despite Obama’s early promising willingness to partner with 
Russia in reducing their mutual nuclear arsenals with New START and his ambitious 
“agenda of nuclear related objectives, including a strengthened Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NT), US ratification of the Comprehensive (nuclear) Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), sponsorship of an international agreement to cap the production of 
weapons grade material (the so-called Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty, or FMCT),” the 
events in Ukraine seemed to have permanently soured U.S.-Russian nuclear 
cooperation for the foreseeable future.87  
Even though the likelihood of another Cold War is extremely slim and there 
has been no direct confrontation between the two countries since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the status of the strategic rivalry between the two countries is a cause for 
concern, specifically due to the fact that Russia and the United States still remain the 
world’s greatest nuclear powers. It is possible to see the subtle influence of nuclear 
weapons in the Ukrainian conflict: “Nuclear weapons were not the explicit concern of 
policymakers and military strategists during the Russo-Ukrainian conflict of 2014. But 
nuclear weapons were important parts of the background leading up to the crisis and of 
the context within which it took place.”88  
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The Kremlin is sending strong messages that it will continue to flex its foreign 
policy might. Despite there being no published evidence that Russia has significantly 
revised its nuclear doctrine from the latest doctrine released in 2014, there is evidence 
of shifts in Russian nuclear doctrine:  
...recent events and statements from the Kremlin and other 
authoritative Russian sources strongly suggest that Moscow 
envisions nuclear weapons playing a significant role in a limited 
conflict with the West, a conflict that appears less implausible in 
the wake of Moscow’s seizure of Crimea, its continuing 
incursions into eastern Ukraine, and its broader posture of 
antagonism towards the West and interest in revising the post-
Cold War political settlement in the areas in and around the 
former Soviet Union. Nor does this situation appear likely to 
improve, especially with the Russian military playing an 
increasing role in the Kremlin’s foreign policy. Vladimir Putin 
and the broader Russian leadership appear to have concluded that 
relations with the West have fundamentally deteriorated and that 
political confrontation will continue. It therefore appears likely 
that the Kremlin will continue to view nuclear weapons as a key 
part of Russia’s strategy and military posture, and will look upon 
them as a method of compensating for the country’s weakness in 
relation to NATO.89  
 
There is also the question of how NATO will deal with the consequences of the 
Ukrainian conflict. Although Russia has been treading carefully in Ukraine post-
Crimea, given that the Ukrainian conflict is located in Europe’s backyard, the question 
of the future of NATO’s nuclear forces is automatically invoked:  
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that the 
crisis in Crimea would have an impact on the nuclear doctrines of 
NATO countries. And this could mean that the NATO countries 
will disavow their oral guarantees, given to Russia, about not 




moving nonstrategic U.S. nuclear weapons, based in Europe 
today, onto the territories of new member states in the east – for 
example, in Poland, Romania and Hungary. This also means that 
it will be impossible to speak about any missile defense 
cooperation today. In the worst-case scenario, it will mean the 
resumption of the nuclear arms race. Apparently, at least until 
2018, when the period of disarmament under the New START 
Treaty of 2010 ends, it is possible to forget about any major 
initiatives, from major nuclear powers, in the field of nuclear 
disarmament.90 
 
Although this reflects an extreme worst-case scenario, nevertheless, the fact that Russia 
has embarked on an irreversible course of hegemonism in Ukraine is a clear cause for 
concern on the part of the United States. 
 Finally, there is the push for the modernization of the nuclear arsenals of both 
countries. Instead of quantity, Russia is focusing on the quality of its remaining 
arsenal. Russia is currently undergoing a comprehensive modernization process and 
upgrading its arsenal: 
Russia is modernizing its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear 
warheads…. It is in the process of retiring all Soviet-era ICBMs 
and replacing them with new systems, a project that according to 
Moscow is about halfway complete...Russia’s upgrades to its 
nuclear arsenal help justify modernization programs in other 
nuclear weapon states, and raise questions about Russia's 
commitment to its obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons.91  
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In connection to Russia’s plans to modernize is the U.S. claim that Russia has been in 
violation of the INF Treaty:  
In July 2014, the U.S. State Department officially assessed that 
Russia was in violation of the agreement due to its production and 
testing of a prohibited ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM). 
The United States called a meeting of the Special Verification 
Commission, the dispute resolution process created by the treaty, 
in November 2016 to raise the issue. In March 2017, U.S. Air 
Force Gen. Paul Selva, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
testified at a congressional hearing that Russia had deployed the 
missile in dispute, the SSC-8.92  
 
Russia has vehemently denied that it is in violation of the INF Treaty and has pointed 
out that U.S. defense missile systems in Europe have the same capability as GLCMs. 
Neither side has been able to reach an agreement on this issue and it has become yet 
another issue hindering closer arms control cooperation. The United States has also 
announced its plans to modernize its nuclear arsenal:  
Under Obama, it was decided that the United States would pursue 
replacements for all three legs of the nuclear triad while investing 
resources to ensure that the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) and its laboratories, which maintain and 
monitor U.S. nuclear weapons, have what they need to keep U.S. 
weapons safe, secure, and effective.93 
 
Although both countries are facing serious financial challenges in modernizing their 
nuclear arsenal, the fact that both the U.S. and Russia have remain committed to 
investing enormous amounts of funding and resources into upgrading and modernizing 
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their nuclear arsenals conveys the impression to non-nuclear states that the United 
States and Russia are more interested in revamping their remaining nuclear arsenal 
than pursuing steady reductions to reach the ideal goal of zero nuclear weapons.  
 In the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing ramifications 
Ukrainian conflict, the gap between the United States and Russia has only continued to 
grow. The Syrian conflict has only ensured that the rift remain permanent. 
 
III. Syria 
 Background of the Syrian Civil War 
During the early stages of its onset in March 2011, the pro-democracy protest against 
President Bashar Assad appeared to be a continuation of the Arab Spring movement 
sweeping across the Middle East. Yet in hindsight, few would have been able to 
fathom the destructive and destabilizing extent to which the Syrian civil war has 
escalated, stretching towards its seventh year at the time this thesis is being written. As 
of early 2017, the estimated death toll in Syria has peaked at 465,000, including those 
reported missing, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a “Britain-
based war monitor.”94 Untangling the myriad of events that have resulted in this 
staggering death toll is unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, a 
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concise outline of the major events of the Syrian civil war is necessary in order to 
analyze how U.S.-Russian relations have been impacted by the Syrian conflict.  
 The eruption of widespread anti-government protests against the Assad regime 
in the first half of 2011 was met with decisive force by Assad, who ordered the Syrian 
Army to resort to violence in order to put down the protesters. The violence only 
magnified the intensity of the protests, and by October 2011, the opposition presented 
a united front by forming a body of “internal and exiled opposition activists” known as 
the New Syrian National Council.95 By March 2012, efforts to seek a peaceful 
resolution in light of the escalating violence resulted in a non-binding UN Security 
Council resolution devised by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, yet the peace 
plan failed to take root. After reports on the use of chemical weapons by Assad’s 
forces against Syrian civilians surfaced in August 2012, Obama responded with his 
“red line” policy on the use of chemical weapons, which was later viewed as a foreign 
policy failure by a majority of the American policy community due to the fact that 
Obama did not back his “red line” with any actionable plan. 
 The situation in Syria continues to deteriorate and the use of chemical weapons 
have complicated Syria’s future prospects for a peaceful resolution. In September 
2013, the United Nations confirmed the use of chemical weapons in an attack against 
Syrian civilians by government forces, resulting in the death of hundreds of civilians. 
                                                





In a brush of diplomatic luck, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry was able to reach an 
agreement with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, on a plan to destroy Syria’s 
remaining chemical weapons arsenal. The U.S.-Russian agreement was facilitated by 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and gave Syria 
until early 2014 to dispose of all of its chemical weapons.  
 Yet, efforts to further seek a peaceful resolution to the Syrian civil war through 
diplomatic negotiations in Geneva have so far been doomed to fail, largely due to 
Assad’s outright refusal to allow any sort of challenge to his power, such as the 
creation of a transitional government. However, by 2014, Assad would face greater 
challenges to his rule, specifically the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS), a jihadist militant 
group that has been designated as terrorist group and is known for its especially brutal 
and ruthless methods of violence. ISIS has created further instability in the region, and 
has swiftly gained a foothold in Iraq and Syria. In the face of the rise of ISIS and its 
global campaign of terrorism, the U.S., along with five other Middle Eastern states, 
began to deploy airstrikes against ISIS-held territory in Syria in September 2014.  
ISIS has proven to be a unifying common enemy for all the actors in the Syrian 
civil war. As the Assad regime’s staunchest ally, Russia has consistently vetoed any 
possible international proposal to resolve the violence in Syria that calls for the 
removal of President Assad. Russia’s continued support of Assad’s regime has made it 
a target of Western criticism, and Russia would eventually lose its seat at the UN 
Human Rights Council in 2016. Nonetheless, ISIS has changed the nature of Russia’s 
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involvement in Syria. To combat the spread of ISIS, Russia began launching its own 
airstrikes against ISIS strongholds in September 2015. Russia’s increasing military 
involvement in Syria has resulted in a growing casualty rate, but its number is tightly 
guarded from the Russian public to avoid any potential domestic political backlash 
arising from Russia’s involvement:  
The true level of casualties in the Syrian conflict is a sensitive 
subject in a country where positive coverage of the conflict 
features prominently in the media and ahead of a presidential 
election next year that incumbent Vladimir Putin is expected to 
win. The scale of Russian military casualties in peacetime has 
been a state secret since Putin issued a decree three months before 
Russia launched its operation in Syria. While Russia does not give 
total casualties, it does disclose some deaths. Discrepancies in 
data may be explained partly by the fact that Russia does not 
openly acknowledge that private contractors fight alongside the 
army; their presence in Syria would appear to flout a legal ban on 
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Map 2:  
Map of Syria and Iraq as of October 2017 
 
BBC News “Islamic State and the Crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps” 
 
At the time of writing, the Russian military is still engaged in Syria and 
Russian involvement in Syria will continue to contribute to the emerging strategic 
rivalry between the U.S. and Russia, especially in the aftermath of the Ukrainian 
conflict: 
After the direct Russian military intervention into Syria became a 
reality, some observers would assert that the primary motivation 
for Putin’s forceful move into the Middle East was to divert 
attention from Ukraine and to force the West to negotiate with 
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him. It was true that Putin used the advances of ISIS as an 
opportunity to engage Obama and the West on both crises.97  
 
However, the upcoming March 2018 Russian elections have forced Putin to 
reconsider his strategy towards Syria, especially in regards to justifying his policies to 
his domestic public: “...Putin does not want Syria to be a negative issue going toward 
the next presidential elections…[it] may be the major reason he has wanted to “solve” 
Aleppo so quickly and pivot again toward efforts to pose as a peacemaker.”98 Putin has 
purposefully left his Syrian policies open-ended and vague, but with an upcoming 
election and stagnant economy, it can be predicted that there will be some curtailment 
of future Russian involvement in Syria. 
Implications from the Syrian Case Study 
Even though there is no hard, empirical evidence of doctrinal changes in nuclear policy 
on the part of the Russians or the Americans, given that nuclear cooperation is 
overwhelmingly colored by political relations, it is quite clear that the Syrian conflict 
has contributed to the overall worsening of U.S.-Russian relations. The Syrian civil 
war has become a protracted international disaster on many levels, creating a refugee 
crisis and unstable geopolitical situation that will have lasting ramifications for years to 
come. Yet, the focus of this thesis has been on impact of the Syrian conflict on U.S.-
Russian prospects for arms control cooperation along with the impact on overall 
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relations. After relations reached their lowest point in light of the annexation of 
Crimea, the Syrian conflict has only ensured that relations remain estranged. 
American involvement in the Syrian War increased Russian distrust and 
wariness of U.S. foreign policy, which had been growing since the 2011 American 
decision to intervene in Libya:  
On the heels of the Libyan intervention, the US campaign against 
Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian civil war was perceived as more of 
the United States recklessly toppling regimes without considering 
the chaos that would follow...The administration in turn grew ever 
more convinced that Russia was not bent on stirring up trouble 
wherever it promised to create problems for the United States or, 
in the Syrian case, seeking short-term gains with no regard for the 
Assad regime’s role in a barbarous war.99  
 
 The Syrian civil war presents a complex and ever-shifting geopolitical conflict 
that is far from resolved today. The United States initially offered American support of 
the opposition forces against the Assad regime, but eventually this support would 
wane. On the other hand, Russia has increased its involvement over time. Russia’s 
initial support of Assad was limited to blocking UN resolutions demanding Assad’s 
removal, but later grew into full-scale military support. Therefore, it is clear that there 
is an asymmetry in the degree of involvement between the two countries. Yet, despite 
this asymmetry, the extensive and substantial geopolitical relevance of Syria’s conflict 
compounded the negative tensions between the two countries.  
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Furthermore, the brief flickers of U.S.-Russian cooperation were not helpful in 
quelling any fears of a permanent estrangement between the two countries. The 2013 
joint U.S.-Russian plan to ensure the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal 
was a brief but shining moment of U.S.-Russian cooperation on weapons of mass 
destruction. Yet, more examples of the United States and Russia seeing eye-to-eye in 
Syria are hard to come by. Although it is tempting to downplay the impact of the 
Syrian civil war as insignificant to U.S.-Russia nuclear relations, doing so would be a 
grave error. Despite the lack of formal changes in nuclear doctrine, the Syrian war did 
contribute greatly to increasing the hostility between the two nations, closing the door 
on closer cooperation, and fraying relations.  
 In the long-run, the Syrian conflict did more harm than good to the already 
fragile U.S.-Russian relations, as opportunities for closer cooperation quickly dried up 
after Moscow’s 2015 decision to provide military support to Assad in his war against 
the Syrian people. This left the United States no choice but to abandon all hope of 
finding any possibility of being able to partner with Russia in resolving the disastrous 
humanitarian consequences stemming from the Syrian conflict. From Russia’s 
perspective, it has been able to gain an elevated sense of international prestige from the 
Syrian conflict:  
There is a clear prospect of Moscow achieving the main political 
aim of the ‘Syrian gambit’—establishing a new kind of 
relationship with the United States and restoring ‘geopolitical 
parity’ with Washington in the global hierarchy. The emerging 
format of the Syrian settlement . . . would successfully get 
	
	 76	
Moscow out of the ghetto of ‘regional power,’ which it found 
itself in after getting bogged down in east Ukraine.100  
 
There is more and more glaring evidence that U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation is in 
decline. Russia’s decision to skip out on the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit is an 
obvious demonstration of this trend. The spillover of politics into the realm of nuclear 
cooperation is a great cause for concern, especially given that both countries have 
always maintained that nuclear cooperation will remain above politics:  
Russia's refusal to participate in the Nuclear Security Summit in 
Washington, D.C. at the end of March fundamentally changes the 
nature of U.S.-Russia relations. The interaction between Moscow 
and Washington has always been strained, and the past five to 
seven years have been marked by military and political crises. 
However, in spite of all their differences, the Kremlin and the 
White House kept claiming that they would never stop 
cooperating in two areas: counter-terrorism and 
nonproliferation...both sides declared their dedication to 
strengthening non-proliferation regulations, which made for a 
limited, but workable agenda for cooperation.101  
 
Yet it appears that the Ukrainian and, to a lesser extent, Syrian conflicts have created a 
permanent rift between the two countries and cooperation in both nuclear and terrorism 
issues are at a standstill: “Last year, the dynamics changed. The idea of a ‘joint fight 
against terrorism’ appears to have died over U.S.-Russia differences over Syria. Now it 
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is starting to look like joint efforts on non-proliferation are following suit. Russia and 
the U.S. seem to be losing their last opportunities for stabilization.”102 Without 
cooperation in these two crucial areas anchoring the relationship, the U.S. and Russia 




This thesis has explored the military-technical barriers and geopolitical factors 
obstructing nuclear arms control between the United States and Russia. The literature 
review provided the theoretical and historical context of the evolution of the U.S.-
Russian arms control framework in order to analyze the case studies. The case studies 
of missile defense and the Ukrainian conflict and its extension into the Syrian conflict 
illuminated the main challenges currently hindering closer arms control cooperation.  
However, the findings point to a larger web of domestic political pressures 
impeding closer arms control cooperation. Putin’s vision of restoring Russia’s 
geopolitical status as a global superpower can be attributed in part to the need to satisfy 
domestic political pressures and has been demonstrated through his assertive foreign 
policy agenda in Ukraine and later in Syria. On the other hand, in a post-9/11 security 
environment, domestic political pressures in the United States have also contributed to 




propelling the U.S. on a global campaign to fight terrorism and protect U.S. national 
interests. The clash of these two national interests have deepened tensions and 
worsened relations, with nuclear arms control cooperation becoming collateral damage. 
As for the future outlook of U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation, the prospects 
for renewing New START and pursuing further reductions in nuclear arms are dim:  
Even extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(New START), which is due to expire in February 2021, is in 
question. If the treaty reaches its end date with nothing to take its 
place, there will be no mutually agreed, verifiable limitations on 
strategic nuclear systems between the two countries whose 
arsenals make up more than 90 percent of the global total.103  
 
This bleak reality has serious implications for the future, yet there has still been no 
headway in seeking to reset arms control cooperation. 
On the part of Russia, it remains adamant that missile defense be connected 
with the broader arms control negotiations framework:  
Moscow has expressed little interest in further nuclear reductions. 
It instead prioritizes limiting missile defenses and has proposed a 
legally binding treaty in which the United States and Russia 
would agree not to target their missile defenses against the other’s 
strategic missiles...Russian officials have also cited the lack of an 
agreement limiting conventional armed forces in Europe as a 
reason for not proceeding with further nuclear reductions. They 
have said that the next nuclear arms negotiation should be 
multilateral.104  
 
Therefore, it is imperative that the U.S. and Russia resolve their disagreement on 
missile defense in order to be able to move on with nuclear arms control cooperation.  
                                                




Given the enduring disagreements on missile defense and foreign policy 
differences, it is clear that, far from moving towards the warmer relations envisioned 
after the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia are currently re-engaging 
as strategic rivals. The reset of the U.S.-Russian strategic rivalry has many geopolitical 
consequences that expand far beyond the bilateral relationship, as scholars and 
policymakers alike continue to ponder whether the current U.S.-Russian strategic 
rivalry can be considered a revival of Cold War tensions.  
More importantly for this thesis, the current U.S.-Russian estrangement has 
serious implications for the future of nuclear weapons. Even outside the sphere of 
U.S.-Russian relations, the consequences of declining nuclear cooperation have a 
major impact on the rest of the nuclear world order. Notably, issues such as the recent 
nuclearization of states like Pakistan and India, the enduring North Korean quest to be 
recognized as a nuclear weapon state, and the challenge of securing nuclear materials 
and preventing nuclear terrorism, all require full and utmost cooperation among the 
nuclear power states. In the midst of the growing U.S.-Russian strategic rivalry, there 
is also China’s increasing economic strength and political influence. To deter any 
potential Chinese ambitions of expanding their nuclear arsenal, it is the responsibility 
of the United States and Russia to exercise restraint and demonstrate prudence in their 
nuclear policies to avoid triggering a greater global nuclear arms race. 
Therefore, as the two greatest nuclear powers, the U.S. and Russia have an 
outsized influence on the rest of the nuclear order. This adds another dimension of 
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urgency to U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control cooperation. If U.S.-Russian arms 
control efforts do indeed come to a halting stop and the two countries no longer 
acknowledge the need to reduce their arsenals, this would negatively impact the 
international nuclear nonproliferation regime, sending a dangerous message to aspiring 
nuclear states. In this regard, U.S.-Russian arms control efforts are a benchmark in the 
broader framework of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It is imperative that U.S.-
Russian nuclear reductions continue to proceed and relations strengthen in order to 
defuse the risks of wider regional nuclear conflicts elsewhere in the world.  
Looking forward, the question of how the two countries will be able to set 
aside their conflicting foreign policy agendas, reach an understanding on missile 
defense, and maintain their nuclear nonproliferation obligations is critical. One place to 
start is by sharing a strategic vision, which has not previously been the case: 
The crucial missing piece for both sides- in fairness, a piece 
missing from the policy of all previous leaderships- was a 
strategic vision for the relationship. It need simply have been a 
notion of what each side wanted the relationship to be five or six 
years down the road; what each thought might be realistically 
accomplished over that period in areas where each had a vital role 
to play; and what obstacles stood in the way. And then the two 
sides would have needed to share their visions, decide where they 
were compatible, and set about pursuing them.105 
 
The lack of a common strategic vision indicates a bigger issue underlying the 
relationship: the lack of open and sincere dialogue between the two countries.  
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In addition to a common strategic vision, Washington and Moscow need to 
share their nuclear doctrines and clarify their positions on the use of nuclear weapons: 
“A doctrinal discussion would provide an opportunity to underscore the importance of 
maintaining a high threshold for nuclear use.”106 Given the ambiguity of Russia’s 
doctrine, the United States should encourage more transparency through example. 
With the recent election of President Trump, the future of nuclear cooperation has 
become much murkier. Shortly after coming into office, President Trump issued a 
presidential memorandum that mandated “a new Nuclear Posture Review to ensure that 
the United States nuclear deterrent is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and 
appropriately tailored to deter 21st-century threats and reassure our allies.”107 Yet, 
understanding how Russia will be viewed in terms of nuclear issues- as a partner or as 
a rival, is an important distinction the Trump administration has yet to make.  
In conclusion, the future prospects for U.S.-Russian arms control cooperation 
are very much dependent on the ability of the two countries to reach an agreement on 
missile defense issues and resolve their foreign policy differences. Yet it must be 
acknowledged that even with the resolution of military-technical and geopolitical 
issues, domestic political conditions must be conducive in order to allow the 
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facilitation of future arms control progress. With the election of Donald Trump, there is 
even more uncertainty:  
Trump has yet to iterate a clear policy stance, in fact, so far, he 
has presented a series of contradictory statements before and after 
his election. The anticipated 2018 release of the Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR) report will reveal whether or not Trump will turn 
back time and seek to increase the nuclear stockpile or continue 
on the trend of nuclear reduction most ardently championed by 
the Obama administration.108  
 
Yet, the signs so far point towards the Trump administration reversing Obama’s 
nonproliferation trend and instead ramping up its nuclear capabilities:  
President Donald Trump, meanwhile, has argued for a need to 
‘strengthen and expand’ the U.S. arsenal, suggested that the 
United States has somehow ‘fallen behind’ in nuclear capability 
(a claim difficult to explain or support), and said that New 
START favors Russia over the United States.109  
 
Therefore, if the United States were to indeed expand instead of reduce its nuclear 
arsenal, the entire arms control cooperation framework would be in grave peril. There 
is the hope that Russia continues to push for arms control cooperation in spite of the 
uncertain U.S. commitment:  
In this dynamic and worrisome atmosphere, it is in Russia’s 
interests to maintain and bolster the infrastructure of arms control 
agreements developed over the decades. Indeed, with the United 
States potentially less interested and engaged—Trump reportedly 
voiced his doubts about New START to Russian President 
Vladimir Putin when the latter inquired about prospects for its 
extension—it is Moscow that faces an imperative to find 
resolutions to existing arms control challenges, including those of 
its own making. It must do this not just to keep from losing what 
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it has today, but to give itself a real chance to attain greater 
security in the future.110 
 
Despite the uncertain future, U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control cooperation 
has come a long way from the early and cautious U.S.-Soviet nuclear reduction 
agreements and the bilateral arms control relationship has survived the ups and downs 
of political disagreements, from “the rise and fall of the détente policy, the war in 
Afghanistan, President Ronald Reagan’s Star Wars, the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the end of the Cold War, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
enlargement.”111 Given the decades spent on the brink of nuclear war and the years 
invested in negotiating the strategic arms reduction treaties, too much is at stake for 
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